Data Protection

Post-quantum cryptography is no longer just a recommendation: deadlines in the US, France, and the EU

In 2026, the migration to quantum-resistant cryptography shifts from a recommendation to a set of mandates with specific dates. The Cloud Security Alliance has compiled them in one place – ranging from a US Executive Order to the French ANSSI’s decision on product certification.

What happened

A CSA research note from July 10, 2026, highlights the convergence of several legal frameworks. In the US, Executive Order EO 14412 was signed on June 22, 2026, setting binding deadlines for federal agencies, followed two days later by OMB Memorandum M-26-15 with a roadmap for 2026–2035. In France, ANSSI has announced the end of certification for products that are not quantum-resistant. In the EU, a coordinated Commission roadmap is in effect.

Key findings

  • USA: Key-establishment cryptography must be quantum-resistant by the end of 2030, and digital signatures for high-value assets by the end of 2031; all other systems by 2035. Agencies were required to submit migration plans within 120 days, approximately by October 22, 2026.
  • France: According to the CSA, ANSSI will stop certifying non-resistant security products starting in 2027, and by 2030, it expects companies to purchase only resistant products. Certification is a prerequisite for sales to the administration and regulated critical infrastructure.
  • EU: Member states are to begin the transition by the end of 2026; critical infrastructure should be protected by post-quantum cryptography by 2030 at the latest, and as many systems as possible by 2035.
  • The technical foundation consists of NIST standards finalized in August 2024: FIPS 203, 204, and 205, including the ML-KEM mechanism.
  • CSA Recommendations: In the next two quarters – inventory cryptography and contracts; within 12–18 months – implement hybrid key exchange (classic + ML-KEM) and early replacement of certificates valid beyond 2030; long-term – ensure cryptographic agility so that algorithms can be replaced without rebuilding systems.

Why it matters

SafeWave Commentary

A quantum computer capable of breaking today’s cryptography does not yet exist, and no one can reliably predict when it will. However, regulatory deadlines are concrete, and for data that must remain confidential for many years, the “harvest now, decrypt later” risk already exists. It is therefore worth separating the future threat scenario from the current migration obligation.

For Polish companies, France’s decision may have an impact sooner than EU regulations: if you sell products or services to the French public sector or critical infrastructure, or supply US agencies, post-quantum requirements will appear in RFPs. The first step is the same everywhere: know where and what kind of cryptography you use, who manages the keys, and which systems – such as HSMs and PKI – can be updated and which must be replaced.